![jomc:
People remain what they are even if their faces fall apart - but does it float
“…We begin, let us imagine, with momentary things and their interrelationships. One of these momentary things, called a, is a momentary stage of the River Cayster, in Lydia, around 400 B.C
Another, called b, is a momentary stage of the Cayster two days later. A third, c, is a momentary stage, at this same latter date, of the same multiplicity of water molecules which were in the river at the time of a. Half of c is in the lower Cayster valley, and the other half is to be found at diifuse points in the Aegean Sea. Thus a, b, and c are three objects, variously related. We may say that a and b stand in the relation of river-kinship, and that a and c stand in the relation of water~kinship.
Now the introduction of rivers as single entities, viz., processes or time-consuming objects, consists substantially in reading identity in place of river-kinship. It would be wrong, indeed, to say that a and b are identical; they are merely river-kindred. But if we were to point to a, and then wait the required two days and point to b, and afiirm identity of the objects pointed to, we should thereby show that our pointing was intended not as a pointing to two kindred river-stages but as a pointing to a single river which included them both. The imputation of identity is essential, here, to fixing the reference of the ostension…
…These contrasts, then, have emerged between general terms and singular terms. First, the ostensions which introduce a general term differ from those which introduce a singular term in that the former do not impute identity of indicated object between occasions of pointing. Second, the general term does not, or need not, purport to be a name in turn of a separate entity of any sort, whereas the singular term does.
These two observations are not independent of each other. The accessibility of a term to identity contexts was urged by Frege as the standard by which to judge whether that term is being used as a name. Whether or not a term is being used as naming an entity is to be decided, in any given context, by whether or not the term is being used as subject in that context to the algorithm of identity: the law of putting equals for equals…”
— W.V.O. Quine, “Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis” [pdf]](http://24.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_l9c47fTC1j1qz77ppo1_500.jpg)
jomc:
People remain what they are even if their faces fall apart - but does it float
“…We begin, let us imagine, with momentary things and their interrelationships. One of these momentary things, called a, is a momentary stage of the River Cayster, in Lydia, around 400 B.C
Another, called b, is a momentary stage of the Cayster two days later. A third, c, is a momentary stage, at this same latter date, of the same multiplicity of water molecules which were in the river at the time of a. Half of c is in the lower Cayster valley, and the other half is to be found at diifuse points in the Aegean Sea. Thus a, b, and c are three objects, variously related. We may say that a and b stand in the relation of river-kinship, and that a and c stand in the relation of water~kinship.
Now the introduction of rivers as single entities, viz., processes or time-consuming objects, consists substantially in reading identity in place of river-kinship. It would be wrong, indeed, to say that a and b are identical; they are merely river-kindred. But if we were to point to a, and then wait the required two days and point to b, and afiirm identity of the objects pointed to, we should thereby show that our pointing was intended not as a pointing to two kindred river-stages but as a pointing to a single river which included them both. The imputation of identity is essential, here, to fixing the reference of the ostension…
…These contrasts, then, have emerged between general terms and singular terms. First, the ostensions which introduce a general term differ from those which introduce a singular term in that the former do not impute identity of indicated object between occasions of pointing. Second, the general term does not, or need not, purport to be a name in turn of a separate entity of any sort, whereas the singular term does.
These two observations are not independent of each other. The accessibility of a term to identity contexts was urged by Frege as the standard by which to judge whether that term is being used as a name. Whether or not a term is being used as naming an entity is to be decided, in any given context, by whether or not the term is being used as subject in that context to the algorithm of identity: the law of putting equals for equals…”
— W.V.O. Quine, “Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis” [pdf]
